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back on the less pertinent rule of interpretation the court was able
to achieve a result which Matthews v. City of Detroit 21 had, shortly
before, indicated was close to its heart, without sacrificing its appar-
ently equally pronounced view on the "well-established rule of exemp-
tion of municipal property from general taxation." 22
J. L. R.
TAXATION
DEFINITION OF "MANUFACTURING" FOR DIFFERENTIAL
VALUATION UNDER OHIO TANGIBLE PERSONALTY
TAX LAW
Taxpayer is engaged in the processing of scrap metal to meet the
elaborate specifications of the American Rolling Mill Co., which uses
the scrap metal so processed to charge its open hearth furnaces. The
processing activity of appellant involves the careful segregation of the
various scrap metals acquired, removal of dross, silica, alloy, and
paint as required, cutting of the odd scraps into uniform size by me-
chanical shears, and packing them into compact, uniform bundles with
hydraulic presses. Claiming to be a "manufacturer" within the pro-
visions of Ohio General Code Section 5385, the taxpayer listed its
personal property in its inventory for taxation at 50% of the true
value thereof, as authorized by Section 5388. The tax commissioner,
in a determination sustained by the Board of Tax Appeals, denied the
classification of a manufacturer and assessed the property at 70% of
true value according to the general rule for valuation of personalty.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, held, reversed; appellant is taxable
as a "manufacturer" within the meaning of the code section."
Section 5385, defining a manufacturer to be "A person who pur-
chases, receives, or holds personal property, of any description, for
the purpose of adding to the value thereof by manufacturing, refining,
-291 Mich. 161, 289 N. W. 115 (1939), carrying to questionable lengths the Michigan
doctrine that evidence of "profit" works legal alchemy on a function normally govern-
mental.
21 City of Wyandotte v. State Board of Tax Admn., supra note 20, at 54, 270 N. V.
at 213.
1Middletown Iron & Steel Co. v. Evatt, Tax Comm., 139 Ohio St. 113, 38 N. E.
(2d) 585 (1941).
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rectifying or by the combination of different materials with a view of
making a gain or profit by so doing," was originally adopted in 1864
as a definition of those productive concerns whose inventories are re-
quired to be averaged for tax purposes.2 When, in 1931, the legis-
lature, free of the old requirement for uniform taxation of person-
alty,3 came to revamp the Ohio ad valoruni tax provisions, Ohio
manufacturers pressed for differential treatment similar to that ac-
corded manufacturers in neighboring states. The concession of a
lower taxable percentage of true value was granted on the theory
that competitive factors made such a move desirable as a general aid
to the state's economic welfare, and that increased values resulting
from the favorable treatment thus accorded would afford additional
derivative sources of revenue. An existing definition of the general
group contemplated being ready at hand, it was adapted to serve as
well the new function.
Some assistance in determining the group encompassed by this
legislation can be gained from the statutory definitional wording. To
be a "manufacturer" one must purchase, receive or hold tangible per-
sonalty, and do so for the purpose of adding to its value. A third
requisite is that of intent to realize a gain or profit; thus one pro-
ducing parts for his own machinery is not engaged in manufacturing
within Section 5385. But beyond these general requirements is the
one that the claimant must be engaged in one or more of the processes
named: rectifying, refining, combining of different materials, manu-
facturing; and the uncertainty in meaning of these terms force resort
to extrinsic aids in an attempt to find the legislative intent. The more
immediate extrinsic aids to finding legislative intent in Ohio are, how-
ever, almost non-existent; for neither committee reports nor journals
of legislative debate are to be had. Even were such sources available,
they would be of little value in the present situation, for it appears
that the legislators intentionally left their purpose loose and general,
satisfied to let the administration by the tax authorities and inter-
pretation by the courts set the limits of the statute's application. In the
absence of any definitive intention on the part of the legislature, re-
sort must be had either to the common meaning of the terms em-
ployed in the statute or to specialized connotations which those terms
have developed at the hands of the social or economic group affected
261 Ohio Laws 90 (1864).
3 OHIO CONST., Art. XII, See. 2.
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by the legislation. Use of the latter type of reference accords with
the newer theory that, legislative intent being a fiction in any event,
the most satisfactory source of meaning is to be found in the reflex
reaction of those toward whom the legislation is apparently directed.4
A sociological or functional approach rather than a search of the di-
gests is thus made necessary. The commonly received meaning of
terms, on the other hand, can be ascertained by resort to dictionary
and judicial definition.
By the latter test, "rectifying" would appear to embrace every
process of distillation, refinement, or purification by chemical change;
while "refining" would cover processes involving removal of impuri-
ties and reduction to an unmixed or pure state. At first blush "com-
bining different materials" appears to raise possibilities of unlimited
coverage rather than problems of limitation; yet lurking in the phrase
is the difficult question of whether the component materials must lose
their identity in order to be "combined." In contrast is the abundance
of judicial definition of "manufacturing"; typical is the view that it
consists in "the production of articles for use from raw or prepared
materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities, properties,
or combinations, whether by hand-labor or by machinery." r
However, in grappling with the definitional issue in the first case
to come before it involving the 1931 statute,6 the Ohio Supreme Court
echoed the emphasis of the early Sohn & Co.7 opinion upon the exist-
ence of skilled hand labor as the sine qua non of manufacturing. That
case, Schumacher v. Tax Comm.,8 holding machinery used in crush-
ing and screening stone into various merchantable sizes not to be en-
titled to special treatment, is clearly contrary to the current lay con-
ception of the nature of the manufacturing process as one involving
the creation of new form or new qualities by the application of either
handicraft or machine technology. 9 A Kentucky decision,' recogniz-
4 Landis, A Note on Statutory Interpretation (1940) 43 H.ARv. L. REv. 886; Radin,
Statutory Jnterpretation (1930) 43 id. 868.
5 Franklin-American Laundry and Dry Cleaning Co. v. Tax Comm., 14 Ohio L. Abs.
357 (1932); American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Urogdex, 283 U. S. 1 (1930).
'Schumacher Stone Co. v. Tax Comm., 134 Ohio St., 529, 18 N. E. (2d), 405 (1938).
'Engle v. Sohn & Co., 41 Ohio St. 691, 52 Am. Rep. 103 (1885).
8 134 Ohio St. 529, 18 N. E. (2d), 405 (1938).
9Just as the Schumacher opinion emphasized skilled handicraft as necessary to "manu-
facturing," so some attempt has been made to delimit the type of material acted upon in
the manufacturing process to such as is "raw" in the sense that it is in an untouched and
natural state. Such an attack is unwarranted in fact, as witnesses the following definition:
"Though the term 'raw material' is retained in many definitions of 'manufacture', it de-
notes merely the material out of which the final product is made. It is obvious that what
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ing a stone crushing concern as a manufacturer within the meaning
of a statute similar to Ohio's G. C. 5385, is more in accord with the
present-day conception. Equally so is the Schumacher viewpoint in
conflict with industry's idea of the meaning of "manufacturer"; the
Ohio Manufacturers' Association includes among its members several
companies engaged in stone crushing. On the other hand, should the
Schumacher decision be left unchallenged as barely without the statu-
tory coverage,"l nothing in stare decisis would require a like result in
the principal case. Notwithstanding the views of the Chief Justice
and the Board of Tax Appeals, to the operations in the earlier situa-
tion are here added activities that would clearly appear to bring the
Middletown Co. within at least two of the four processes alternatively
named by Sec. 5385.2 Out-of-state judicial treatment, again from
Kentucky,'-' and the opinion of the trade, "I both point conclusively to
the correctness of the judicial decision that taxpayer was entitled to
the 50% valuation on its property.
Unnecessary, therefore, was the court's buttressing of its con-
clusion by putting "the decision in this case upon a broader ground." "I
For in formulating the derivative rule that taxpayer was a manufac-
turer because the scrap processing in which it is now engaged was
formerly a function carried on by the American Rolling Mill as an
essential part of its admitted manufacturing enterprise, the court has
opened up the statute to parasitical attachment by firms claiming par-
tial exemption because, while in their own immediate activities they
are scarcely "manufacturers," as a stage in a vertical industrial pat-
tern they are a part of manufacturing endeavor. Inasmuch as this
interpretation would allow the statutory exemption to those denied it
ih raw material to one is a finished product to another. To the tanner, leather is a man-
ufactured product, but to the shoemaker it is raw material." People v. Holdridge, 4 Lan-
sing (N. Y.), 511 (1871).
"Commonwealth, ex rel. Reckcastle v. W. J. Sparks Co., 222 Ky. 606, S. W. (2d),
1W50 (1928).
U Ba~is for the decision of the court might be found in a socio-psychological approach
to th5 kgislatiwQ intent. Viewing G. C. § 6488 as an act motivated by the need to induce
manufacturers to come to or remain in Ohio, it is possible that the Ohio court felt that
,t,,ne c-uhtrs were not within the class which would respond to such treatment, that
class being limited to productive concerns which are in a position to decide on a situs on
the basis of tax conditions, because relatively unrestrained in their choice by the location
4 raw materials and the profitable scope of their market.
12These two are refining, and combining different materials.
13 David J. Joseph Co. v. City of Ashland, 223 Ky. 203, 3 S. W. (2d), 218 (1928).
I4 The Ohio Mlanufacturers' Association expressed the opinion that, while the Middle-
town Iron & Steel Co. is not a member of the association, if it did apply for membership
it would be accepted as having all the necessary qualifications.
z Middletown Iron & Steel Co., supra at 125.
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by the Schumacher reasoning, the court's action may possibly repre-
sent a sub silentio repudiation of its earlier construction of Sec. 5385.
Such repudition, it is true, would be unnecessary for the stone crush-
ing concerns themselves, for they had meanwhile found relief in the
legislature. By the 1939 amendment of Sec. 5388, not only they, but
farmers and towel and linen suppliers as well, had gained the 5o%
rate.' 6 This followed by some years similar legislative relief17 from
unfavorable lower court judgment 11 as to the nature of the opera-
tions of laundries and dry cleaners; and preceded by a biennium the
1941 addition of Sec. 5388-5,'" which anticipatorily does the same for
rural electric cooperatives. Indeed, in these repeated legislative ex-
pressions of dissatisfaction with the judicial handling of the problem
may be found the cue to the Supreme Court's present gratuitous
dictun. For, although technically they involve no effort to define as
"manufacturing" the activities of the named businesses, there is mani-
fest in them as a legislative intent that Sec. 5385 enjoy a liberal
interpretation. Very possibly, therefore, it was to avoid the unsatis-
factory alternative of likely continued legislative patch-work that the
court went beyond the requirement of the case before it to put its
decision on a "broader ground," hoping thereby to impute into the
definitional section an acceptable basis for administration of this im-
portant aspect of Ohio's taxation of tangible personalty.
W. C. D.
TREATMENT OF CREDITS UUDER OHIO INTANGIBLE TAX
LAWS-ADVANCE PAYMENTS NOT ACCOUNTS PAYABLE
Taxpayer, a manufacturer of machinery on special order, requires
its customers to advance monies before delivery. In returning its
personal property for Ohio taxation, taxpayer claimed a deduction
of such advances from its "credits" under Ohio Gen. Code Sec. 5327,
the controlling portion of which reads: "The term credits as so
-used, means the excess of the sum of all current accounts receivable
and prepaid items used in business when added together estimating
every such account and item at its true value in money, over and
above the sum of current accounts payable of the business, other
11 118 Ohio Laws 609.17 115 Ohio Laws 564.
13 Laundry and Cleaning Co. v. Tax Comm., 30 N.P. (zi.s.) 25, affd, 14 Ohio L. Abs.
357 (1932).
19 119 Ohio Laws 215.
